When we were getting close to invading Iraq in March of 2003, several friends came to me to ask my opinion about the Administration’s venture.  The men in my family, which is a Navy-Marine Corps family, discussed the subject at great length.  Our discussions centered on not whether we should go in, but when and why.  Evidently, we were going to bring a new and democratic dynamic to the Mid-East.  We were going to eliminate those dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

For my part, I always counseled caution.  Having been in the Marine Corps at the end of Vietnam War, and having made a serious study of my profession, my take was simple.  Before we saw fit to expend one Marine’s life, I said, we had better measure the risks; we had better define the strategic objectives and we had better know what the odds of achieving the end game were.  In the end, like most Americans, I trusted that the Bush Administration had, in mature fashion, made those calculations.  I supported our regime’s effort to change the other guy’s regime.  This was before I knew that one of the precious lives expended in the effort would be that of my own son.

Since he was killed in Iraq in December of 2005, I have been trying to make sense of my son’s death in the wider context of this question: “Was his death in vain?”  And further, both before and since the November 2006 election results, “What do we do from this point forward to ensure that our nation’s blood and treasure are spent wisely?”

As to the first question, I have long since come to the conclusion that, in the greater scheme of things, no American who, like my son, sacrificed his life for his buddies and this nation, has died in vain.  To think otherwise is like saying that those who “gave the last full measure of devotion” at the battle of Gettysburg died in vain.  They did not, because, as Abraham Lincoln foretold, from those honored dead, this nation celebrated a new birth of freedom.  Our government, of, by, and for the people, did not perish from the face of the earth.

So from this perspective, and because I do not think that this nation shall perish but will continue to flourish (although I question any “new births” of freedom), I do not think that the three thousand American lives spent in Iraq have been spent in vain.  But moving to the next question, I ask, “Have they and shall they be spent wisely?”

While I have always been interested in foreign affairs, and while I have lived in or visited a number of countries, I knew that I was unprepared, by training and experience, to answer this question.  From December 2005 forward, I have studied everything that I could get my hands on to become familiar with the Iraq campaign.  I read articles and news accounts in at least three papers weekly.  I have read or listened to the opinions of alleged experts – the opinions of Smart Men of all factions and perspectives, both American and foreign, both military and civilian.  I have come to think of most them as Sadducees and Pharisees.  That is, while they may know what they are talking about from the viewpoint of their particular fields of expertise, most of them have missed the Big Picture.

I do not intend to impugn the motives or character of any administration official or military officer whose influence or decisions have gotten us to this point.  My opinion is that the great majority of them have served honorably and to the very best of their abilities.  Any attempt at an accounting by the average citizen (or a Democratic House or Senate) would now not only be futile, but counter productive.  Understanding this, I ask that the reader allow me to reveal my bitterness at my loss to this extent:  I do not like Donald Rumsfeld because he cheats at racquet ball.  I despise Dick Chaney and his former minion, Scooter Libby, the intelligence abortionist, because they are not truthful.

Although there are several options being discussed at the moment (all are grasping at the seventy-nine straws of the just-released findings of the Iraq Study Group), the most serious discussions being batted around in the mainstream press are: 1) troop strength levels, and the derivatives thereof, that is, should we train, fight, or both, and when do we bring the boys home, 2) negotiating with Iraq’s neighbors, particularly Syria and Iran, to bring about a modicum of stability, and 3) preventing tripartite division of the country.

1.  Troop Strength Levels

As to the issue of troop strength levels, it seems to me that because we refused, at the outset, once the combat phase was over, to follow the most basic military dictum of “seize, hold, and consolidate”, we have been overtaken by events.  The guerrilla that does not lose, wins.  Because we could not or would not send in sufficient troops to fully interdict the insurgents’ major supply and reinforcement routes, to occupy and police the major cities with overwhelming forces, to protect critical infrastructure (and museums), we did not and have never furnished sufficient security to minimize our own casualties or to permit political processes to flourish.  In short, because we never furnished an occupied population with a militarily secure environment, we have permitted the insurgents to deflect loyalties of most Iraqi factions away from our goal of a unified government.  The insurgents have effectively sabotaged our efforts to establish a semblance of order.  Significantly, once the Shiite mosque in Samarra was blown in February of this year, the civil war so desired by (the now deceased) al-Zarqawi was truly born.

I submit that by now events have so overtaken us that it may not much matter what mission our troops outside of Al Anbar Province are given.  The guerrilla that does not lose, wins.  The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites has become so polarized that the Iraqi government, whose writ goes unheeded in the critical provinces, has become an instrument of Shiite extremists, megalomaniacs, criminals, and goons.  Its sole underlying interest is consolidating Shiite power in strategically important areas, not in achieving federalist compromises with the Sunnis.  This means that the Iraqi government’s primary interests vis-a-vis the United States is to milk us for everything it can and to direct our troops to hot spots where its own forces or militias lack the wherewithal to restore order (or detain and murder Sunnis).

Caught in the middle of this dog fight, our mission of suppressing the 30,000 strong insurgency is pretty befuddled.  While the Marines can hold Al Anbar Province for now, the Iraqi Army will never hold it. Given the country-wide chaos that has emerged, it is hard for our military commanders to concentrate on destroying the Alqeda network and its allies, the remnant Baathists.  This brings us back to the domestic U.S. discussion of “What to do?”  The only serious question being debated among the most influential of our political class is how and when to withdraw the troops.  We may call this the “Plan For a Graceful Retreat”, or, more accurately, the “Unmitigated Disaster Plan”.

You may note that I have dismissed the issue of embedding our troops with the Iraqi Army as an effective tactic.  The proposed Study Group deadline of removing most of the combat arms from the country by March of 2008 makes that task an impossible one.  We simply cannot train the 15,000 to 20,000 troops that would be needed and get them embedded in time to have any lasting effect.

The most punted about scenario is one that envisions gradually drawing down the U.S. forces (by stated “benchmarks”) to a rump army of 50,000 whose mission would be to act as a kind of logistics unit and fire brigade. Its most urgent role would put out conflagrations that the Iraqi army cannot.  Let us call this descent of military strategy “Whack-a-Mole Lite”.   In other words, the guerillas or insurgents would be permitted to choose a battleground at their leisure, then ensure that we would be called upon by the Iraqi government to fight the battle on their terms.  I think that a Dien Bien Phu is a Dien Bien Phu by any other name.

I think too that this idea of a gradual draw-down of troops is another part of the recipe for disaster.  As our response capabilities decrease, the guerrillas will progress their insurgency (as theorized by Mao Tse Tung) from Phase I to Phases II and III.  They will increasingly mount larger and larger campaigns by regular forces, seeking to hold discrete territories, most likely in Al Anbar Province, which they could then govern.  Whether these attempts individually succeed or fail is, in the end, immaterial.  The perception among the populations of Iraq would be that the guerrillas’ eventual success is inevitable.  Allegiances held by important sheiks would shift.  At some point, Al Anbar Province’s entire population shall rise against us or the “unified” Iraqi government.

For these reasons, I think that the only sane solution is to firm up the Iraqi government as best as we can for some period of time (six months, perhaps), then pull our people out quickly and entirely.  We might want to plan for this evolution.  As of today, in our hubris, we have already betrayed every Iraqi who voted for a unified government and who proudly displayed a purple finger in proof thereof.  To be fair, and to avoid useless finger-pointing, we should understand that the ultimate purpose of our experiment may never have been achievable.  Who could have predicted the intractability of the Sunnis or that they would prefer murderous strife to a unified government with ascendant Shiites?

I also suggest that we make arrangements to extract the many Iraqis, both Sunni and Shiite, who have aided us.  If we do not remove them from the scene, we shall have consigned many of them to certain death.  For their sake, and ours, and for all the world to see, we should not repeat the 1975 travesty of flight from our embassy roof in Saigon.

2. Talking With the Neighbors

To paraphrase Von Clauswitz, diplomacy is merely war carried on by other means.  This means that negotiating from a position of weakness is never a desirable option, and that it should be done only as a last resort.  It may be properly done, for example, when a war is lost.  In our case, bringing Iran and Syria to the table, having in our heyday warned them to keep their fingers out of Iraq (to no avail), means that we shall have to make real concessions to gain the pretence of their cooperation in establishing the stability we seek.

What Syria wants is plain for all to see.  It wants, with no interference, full control of the northern half of Lebanon.  Both Syria and Iran want the southern half held in the grasp of their client, Hesbollah.  If James Baker means what he says about “not just talking to our friends”, he shall have to reassure us often that the sacrifice of many patriotic Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim, and Israeli Jews is indeed for the Greater Good.  And never mind the promotion of democracy in the region.

As for the Iranians, we shall have to acquiesce, to some degree, to their self-proclaimed “peaceful pursuit” of The Nuc and their goal of achieving hegemony over Shiites in the entire Mid East.  So much for deterring nuclear proliferation anywhere.  And, again, never mind the promotion of democracy in the region.  But perhaps we can persuade the Iranians to stop shipping Non-Improvised Explosive Devices to their clients in Iraq.  This, at least, would be helpful.

I think too, that the idea of talking to Iran ignores their strategic interest in having Iraq remain in chaos or becoming divided.  They feel that they would have a natural ally in a Shiite dominated and oil rich government in the south of Iraq.  Why should they fear an Al Anbar Province that is a staging ground for Al Queda?  The United States is the Mullahs’ ultimate and consummate enemy; likewise, the United States is Al Queda’s natural enemy.  What is there for Iran not to like in this scenario?

3. Dividing up the Country

To paraphrase Julius Caesar, another military man, all Iraq is already divided into three parts.  The task of deciding territorial disputes in the process of this ongoing division is already underway in the form of a nascent civil war.  The process will continue to be very messy, very deadly, very prolonged, and very tragic.  At the end of this road, the only remaining vestige of democracy will be in the north, in the new Kurdistan.  Who knows what the Sunnis and Shiites will make of the rest of the country?  Not I.  Not anyone.

The nub of this particular subject of debate is that we can do nothing to stop the process.  We cannot change the facts on the ground.  As hard as we may try, Iraq is no longer a place where we can successfully participate in the experiment of nation building.  Our troops and our contractors no longer have a role in this regard; they are simply in the way.

In sum, Iraq, to all intents and purposes, is a world lost to us.  This statement is not made to malign the commanding officer of our forces, General John Abizaid, who is dedicated to his given mission, who is far-seeing, and who is extremely capable.  This is not to impugn our ambassador, Zalmay Kalilzad, who has been brilliant in his efforts to bring the contending parties together to solve their common problems, and to form a unified and effective Iraqi government.  Sometimes, you can lead horses to water, but you just can’t make them drink.  At this juncture, the Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq will not partake of peaceful power sharing.  Instead, many scoundrels seek power and will sacrifice their children and anyone else to achieve it.

So, the game is over.  In leaving Iraq, we shall leave behind an unfulfilled dream and a sanctuary for our enemies.  More regimes will fall than we ever imagined.  We shall, somehow, have to start anew on our quest to make the world safe for freedom loving peoples and from the forced imposition of a universal Sharia.

I return now, to the remaining questions before us:  “Have the lives of our young men and women been spent wisely? and “What do we do now?”  My wife, who is much wiser than I, has suggested that I not answer any of these questions in the negative, as we know so many who are still fighting and who deserve to retain hope in their cause.  But I feel that I must be honest in my appraisal because I was taught in the Marine Corps that the prudent commander does not send reinforcements into a losing battle.

Iraq is a lost battle.  Therefore, we ought not put any more precious young men and women in harm’s way.  In this light, I can only conclude that the lives of those already lost were not spent wisely.  Further, that we should leave Iraq soon and in good battle order, so as to better prepare for the next phase of this clash of philosophies, this war against terrorists.  For example, in Afghanistan, it is already half time and we are down by three points.

In parting from this subject, I wish to offer one last note.  Will someone please invite the very patrician John Kerry to spend an afternoon in Section 19 of Quantico National Cemetery?  Should he make the visit he may, if he is very still, hear a whisper upon the wind telling him why my son, a VMI graduate, chose to serve his country in a very difficult place.